

A57 LINK ROADS TR010034

Rebuttal of

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS' DEADLINE 7 SUBMISSION REP7-025

CPRE Peak District and South Yorkshire Branch
Unique Reference: 20029243

DEADLINE 8 – 13th April 2022

CPRE PDSY REBUTTAL OF NH'S RESPONSE REP7-025

Traffic and Transport Networks	
CPRE PDSY REP5-028 in bold <i>NH's response in REP7-025 in italics</i>	Our rebuttal of REP7-025 NH's response to Deadline 7
<p>9.69.2 CPRE: Need for the scheme not established – our proposals would be more effective <i>NH: Need for the Scheme has been firmly established. Please refer to National Highways' paragraph 2.1.12 in CPRE Peak District and South Yorkshire Written Representations (REP4-009) and response to the Examining Authority's Second Written Question 3.9 (REP6-017)</i></p>	<p>The need for the scheme has not been established within the context of the climate emergency and legal carbon budgets, and of radical changes in national and regional transport policy to address the climate emergency, health and well-being, and levelling up.</p>
<p>9.69.3 CPRE: Scheme does not meet its objectives – no objective to support decarbonisation or GM Transport Strategy; essentially an urban scheme with most of trips outside ADM <i>NH: Scheme objectives were set at the start of the preliminary design stage and have been carried through the project. The Transport Decarbonisation Plan was published after the application for the Development Consent Order had been made and it would not have been appropriate to change the objectives of the Scheme post submission. As set out in the Case for the Scheme (REP2-016) the Scheme has taken account of the Greater Manchester Transport Strategy.</i></p> <p><i>Scheme will have significant impacts on both urban and rural travel, with local trips benefiting from significantly reduced congestion and longer distance trips being provided with the means to avoid lengthy diversions. The area referred is only partially controlled by the fixed cost function as indicated in the figure provided. The highlighted areas directly around the main area of influence of the scheme are contained within the area of detailed modelling. The area described contains 48% of the total scheme benefit and of this 59% lies entirely within the area of detailed modelling and so is not subject to the fixed cost function. Only 1.5% of the total benefit falls entirely within the area. It is not correct to say that use of the fixed cost function and masking result in an underestimate of impacts, as</i></p>	<p>The Scheme was developed through the 2015 TransPennine Routes Feasibility Study. In 2015 its objectives covered connectivity, environment, society, capacity, resilience and safety. The objectives have not been amended to respond to legislation of policy changes.</p> <p>The scheme should have had a carbon reduction objective in 2015, given the importance of the Climate Change Act 2008 and the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015. More recent events recognising that there is a climate emergency occurred at the national level in June 2019, with the amendment of the Climate Change Act to meet Net Zero GHG emissions by 2050, and with the relevant local and regional authorities declaring a climate emergency and expediting achievement of Net Zero to before 2040, occurred more than 16 months before the 2020 statutory consultation of the scheme was held.</p> <p>In addition the scheme does not reflect the profound changes in national, subnational and regional transport policy as follows, with 3 of the documents published before the Examination opened on 17 Nov 2021</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gear change – a bold vision for walking and cycling 28 July 2020 • Bus Back Better 15 March 2021 • Decarbonising Transport A better greener Britain 14 July 2021 • UK Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener 19 Oct 2021

<p><i>both of these methods are used to improve accuracy in respect to both positive and negative impacts of the modelling process without bias.</i></p>	<p>NH's licence requires 5.29 ... <i>the Licence holder must comply with or have due regard to relevant Government policy, as advised by the Secretary of State, with full regard to any implications for the Licence holder's ability to deliver the Road Investment Strategy (emphasis in the document).</i></p> <p>5.30 <i>For the purposes of this section, "relevant Government policy" means all current policies which:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>a. Relate to the activities of the Licence holder, and</i> <i>b. Have been:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>i. Published in England by or on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, or</i> <i>ii. Indicated to the Licence holder by the Secretary of State.</i> <p>Must is emphasised in the licence as a statutory direction so NH must comply with it. The scheme must therefore comply with all of the above 4 policy documents.</p> <p>Finally, the safety objective (reductions in the number of accidents and reductions in their impacts) which was included in the 2015 and 2018 consultations was removed from the 2020 consultation and the DCO application. This is unacceptable given the adverse impacts on safety on both the SRN and local roads.</p>
<p>9.69.4 CPRE: Scheme does not meet its objectives</p> <p>NH responded only to JTs - <i>Refer to National Highways response reference 9.54.64 in its comments on Keith Buchan on behalf of CPRE PDSY deadline 4 submission (REP5-022) regarding journey times improvements between Sheffield and Manchester delivered by the Scheme. It is not possible to quantify likely changes in journey time reliability due to the Scheme. However, it has been established that when a road network is operating close to or at capacity, then small increases in traffic demand will often cause exceedance in capacity which results in swift and exponential growth in traffic congestion and delay. Consequently, relatively small fluctuations in traffic demand on a road network operating close to or at capacity, such as along the A57 through Mottram, can significantly alter levels of traffic</i></p>	<p>The increase in traffic to and from the motorway "wet end" at the M67 roundabout will result in changes in journey times outside the modelled area which we now know have been damped down by the use of masking, fixed costs networks and coarse zone/network in the area where they would mostly occur (Greater Manchester) – on the road network west of the M67 roundabout.</p> <p>With respect to journey times our challenge was about the failure to present journey times between destinations in central Manchester and central Sheffield. In its answer in LH column NH has jumped from 'regarding journey time improvements' to, in the next sentence, dealing</p>

<p> <i>congestion and delay and thereby, result in poor journey time reliability. The Scheme will increase road capacity on the A57 between Hollingworth and the M67 to accommodate forecast traffic growth, with most of the road network in the vicinity of the Scheme forecast to operate within capacity. Consequently, the Scheme will make this section of road network less sensitive to congestion and delay from fluctuations in traffic demand and, therefore, it is anticipated to improve journey time reliability. Environmental effects are reported in full in the Environmental Statement, within Volume 6 of the DCO application documents. There are no reported significant adverse effects within the PDNP.</i> </p>	<p> with 'journey time reliability'. NH therefore appears to be retracting its claim of journey time improvements and relying on journey time reliability. </p> <p> The connectivity objective in the 2015 TransPennine Routes Feasibility Study included 'reduction in journey times and improved journey-time reliability'. The reference to 'reduction in journey times' was not included in the objectives for the 2018 and 2020 consultations or the DCO application. Instead the latest objectives are concerned only with journey time reliability, which is not the same as journey time reduction. The removal of 'reduction in journey times' from the connectivity objective suggests that further work post-EAST analysis NH found that journey times would not decrease. Until the full journey times between Manchester and Sheffield centres are presented NH's claim of journey time improvements remains unsubstantiated. </p>
<p> 9.69.5 CPRE: The Transport Assessment Report is too superficial to allow full comprehension of the traffic effects. TAR did not supply sufficient detail to assess and comprehend the traffic effects. Subsequent material has cast some light on the significance of this but it should have been in the documents originally submitted. </p> <p> <i>NH: TAR was prepared to best practice standards; National Highways has provided further detailed information regarding the traffic modelling during the examination as and when requested by interested parties. It is not normal practice to submit all the detailed information relating to the traffic and economic analysis and modelling of a scheme due to the complexity and sheer volume of the data that underpins it, which cannot generally be understood and interpreted by interested parties, unless they are specialists in the fields of traffic modelling and economic analysis.</i> </p>	<p> There is substantial evidence that not only has the TAR not followed best practice but it is also inappropriate for assessing an NSIP. Guidance on preparing a Transport Assessment (TA) is presented on the Government planning website Paragraph: 015 Reference ID: 42-015-20140306. The outstanding point made is that 'it is unlikely that a Transport Assessment or Statement in itself could fulfil the specific role required of a transport element of an <u>Environmental Impact Assessment</u> where this is required' (our emphasis). On those grounds alone, which comprehensively undermine the results of the scheme's impact on the environment, the TAR fails to meet best practice and is not fit for purpose. As the scheme is an NSIP it clearly requires an appraisal proportionate to that scale of development, not a TA proportionate to local development. The TAR also fails on a number of other points in the guidance including on collaborative development with local planning/transport authorities and communities, and on assessment of public transport, walking and cycling. </p> <p> We brought this to the attention of NH and the Examination in Sept 2021 RR-0485 when Keith Buchan stated <i>It is important to note that a WebTAG compliant appraisal may or may not have been completed – but it has not</i> </p>

	<p><i>been supplied. The Transport Assessment (TA) is not the same as an Appraisal (we teach this to our entry level graduates) although the TA supplied appears to refer to one... My specific objection is that insufficient evidence has been presented to the DCO to test compliance with Government policy or guidance. From what has been submitted it would appear that it does not.</i></p> <p>This view has now been substantiated by Keith Buchan's work on our behalf. The Examination is now relying on evidence from the four documents supplied to us by NH and submitted by us to the Examination (REP2-090) and on other information extracted from NH by Keith Buchan. His work has clearly shown that the DCO documents supply insufficient evidence to test the scheme's compliance with policy and a failure of the modelling to demonstrate the full impacts of the scheme. As these results inform the ES the DCO should be halted. The full options appraisal should be reviewed. If, as a result, the scheme remains the best option, the scheme should be reassessed with modelling that encompasses Greater Manchester, a full appraisal available for public scrutiny and a proper ES based on traffic flows that represent the full impacts of the scheme .</p> <p>Finally the applicant has no idea who may be participating or responding when it presents its DCO application. In respect of transparency, full disclosure should follow the Aarhus principles, the Gunning principles¹ and the requirements of NH's licence:</p> <p><i>15.19 ...the Licence holder should co-operate with other persons or organisations in a way which is demonstrably:</i></p> <p><i>a. Open and transparent – involving relevant stakeholders, ensuring that essential information is available to affected and interested parties, and that the processes for engagement and communication are clear;</i></p>
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¹ One of the Gunning principles requires **There is sufficient information to give 'intelligent consideration'** - The information contained in a consultation document should not be as inaccurate or incomplete as to mislead potential consultees in their responses.

	<p><i>b. Positive and responsive – seek to build trusting and effective working relationships with key partners and stakeholders, engaging with due efficiency and economy and in a timely manner;</i></p> <p><i>c. Collaborative – working with others to align national and local plans and investments, balance national and local needs and support better end-to-end journeys for road users.</i></p>
<p>9.69.6 CPRE: Alternative measures that would address the problem without invasive road building were dismissed inappropriately... Scheme supplies higher benefits to road users therefore the greater the difficulty in persuading them to meet the DfT Decarbonisation Strategy targets. This is also the reason that modelling the road scheme with the Decarbonisation Strategy traffic reduction targets applied to the forecast but without any specific measures to achieve them would be completely misleading. This applies to the carbon assessment as well as traffic.</p> <p><i>NH: The Scheme does not undermine sustainable alternatives. The scheme provides comprehensive improvements for non-motorised user, does not overall disadvantage bus services and does not preclude future improvements to public transport. See National Highways’ response 3.9. to the Examining Authority’s Second Written Questions (REP6-017) regarding the sustainable transport alternative. Forecast traffic demand used for the assessment of the Scheme is based on The Department of Transport’s (DfT) National Trip End Model (NTEM) which has not been updated to reflect the DfT’s Decarbonisation Strategy as this was only published in July 2021. This is too recent to have been incorporated into NTEM and, thus, the assessment of the Scheme. It also postdates consideration of alternatives to the Scheme and selection of the preferred option.</i></p>	<p>As walking, cycling and public transport have been omitted from the modelling and appraisal NH’s claim cannot be substantiated.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only a small amount of public transport use is included in the model, rail trips for which a car may be available, and appears to be modelled at a coarse regional level (NH have been emailed to clarify this). This was not disclosed by NH until the April 5th ISH despite constant reference to public transport as a whole in our emails and technical meetings • There is no explicit modelling of walking or cycling in the model • There is no account of the time or safety disbenefits of the proposed “walk with traffic” crossings of the new road layouts to pedestrians and cyclists – for example there will be no all red phase for them to cross the main part of the scheme at Mottram • There is no traffic calming/road crossing/public realm strategy for either the existing or the new route
<p>9.69.7 CPRE: A lorry ban coupled with sustainable transport measures and technological improvements was never fully tested in 2015. The test was on an earlier version, it was undertaken against a set of out of date objectives, has no allowance for a variable goods matrix, and relies on</p>	<p>Despite inadequate testing, in the EAST assessment the HGV control system with complementary sustainable measures was equally as effective as the current scheme at solving the problems along the route and only slight less effective at meeting the objectives (2015 TransPennine Routes Feasibility Study Stage 2 Annexes, page 11 in pdf, row 5.1). Now with all the</p>

<p>administrative complexity to reject it. These issues have still not been addressed.</p> <p>NH: <i>The evaluation of the Scheme alternatives was undertaken in compliance with DfT's TAG applicable at the time.</i></p>	<p>results before us the results of the EAST assessment on the A57 Link Roads remains highly questionable.</p>
<p>9.69.8 CPRE: The strategic case has not been updated, as we pointed out in December 2020. The Treasury updated its Green Book in November 2020 which gave the applicant plenty of time for a review of the strategic case. The 2015 high level assessment of options was not repeated and this was confirmed by email. Since this is the key part of the Strategic Assessment, without this it cannot be claimed that the Strategic Case has been updated.</p> <p>NH: <i>The updated Green Book postdates consideration of alternatives to the Scheme and selection of the preferred option.</i></p>	<p>The Treasury Green Book Nov 2020 accompanying 'Guide to developing the Project Business Case' clearly defines that review of a project is required at both the Outline Business Case (OBC) and Full Business Case (FBC). Chapter 6 Planning the Scheme and Preparing the Outline Business Case, Step 4 (pages 43-44), is concerned with determining the potential VfM and includes Action 9, Revisit the Strategic Outline Case (SOC) and confirm the short-list.</p> <p>The document also requires review of the Full Business Case and of the options (Chapter 7 Step 8 Procuring the VfM). The case for change must be revisited because the rationale for the project may have altered since the OBC was approved. The options identified in the OBC economic case must also be confirmed as still valid and that their rankings remain the same. The purpose of this action is evidence that the preferred option remains the same as that identified at the OBC stage. Any new options must be clearly identified and any adjustments to existing options explained. If any of the key assumptions have altered, the FBC must demonstrate that the recommended option continues to offer better public value than the other available options, including the 'do minimum' (if applicable). (our emphasis)</p> <p>There are therefore substantial grounds for review of the alternatives and of the case for change.</p>
<p>9.69.9 CPRE: The nature of the problem has not been defined in the DCO documents. At the strategic level, a failure to identify and assess against key objectives such as carbon reduction, improving air quality and road safety means the problems cannot be identified correctly. A neutral or small negative is not good enough; there are clear policies to make progress on all of these and the Green Book comparison is with</p>	<p>NH have not addressed the issue of problem definition or the need to follow the pathways (i.e. neutral isn't good enough) set out for carbon reduction, health or levelling up.</p>

<p>expenditure which would generate progress in achieving these objectives.</p> <p><i>NH: An assessment of the Scheme covering carbon reduction, air quality and road safety has been undertaken by National Highways, with the outcomes of these assessments being reported in the Environment Assessment (Chapter 14 Climate (REP1-019) and Chapter 5 Air quality (REP3-006) and the TAR (APP-185)).</i></p>	
<p>9.69.10 CPRE: It's piecemeal development - NH's arguments in 2.1.8 and 2.1.9 do not address the point that this scheme is what remains of previous, larger scale proposals; the whole issue of piecemeal implementation disguising real strategic impacts was dealt with as far back as the 1980s and SACTRA. To avoid giving that impression, NH should present its plans for the entire route, in the context of the wider SRN, and present the impacts and how they would be addressed along the entire route.</p> <p><i>NH: National Highways' plans for the entire route are set out in the Route Investment Strategy (RIS) for the A57/A628 corridor. The proposed Scheme represents National Highways' current approach to implementing the plans for the corridor identified in the latest, second, RIS period.</i></p>	<p>The Transport Assessment Report para 1.4.5 sets the scene for development of the scheme, the context of which is shown within the wider corridor, confirming the piecemeal implementation. <i>'Historically numerous proposals have been considered to address longstanding connectivity and congestion issues in the local area and beyond. The development of the Scheme has been considered alongside wider plans to improve Trans-Pennine connectivity'.</i></p> <p>The 2017 South Pennines Route Strategy (NH's licence para 5.13 has a strategic direction to prepare route strategies for the SRN in order to develop and maintain an appropriate evidence base on the state and performance of the network) and RIS 2 confirm the piecemeal nature of the development.</p> <p>(a) The 2017 South Pennines Route Strategy identifies improvements for the entire A57/A628/A616 corridor.</p> <p>(b) RIS2 2020-2025 page 116 includes the Trans-Pennine Tunnel Study – <i>Manchester and Sheffield are not connected directly by a high-quality road. Work during RIS1 has shown that traffic between the two cities is one fifth of that between Manchester and Leeds. However, the presence of the Peak District National Park means that any action to correct this must take full account of potential environmental consequences. We will work in partnership with Transport for the North, local highways and national park authorities to finalise whether high-quality but cost effective connections can provide an appropriate balance between the levelling up of the</i></p>

	<p><i>economy and the environmental impacts on a valued and protected landscape.</i></p> <p>As well as failing to meet the need for a corridor approach and taking a piecemeal approach, there are likely to be further proposals (road based or otherwise) coming forward for the route. Depending on their nature, this scheme may need a radical redesign and this is a further reason for a strategic approach.</p>
<p>9.69.11 CPRE: Instead of following Government guidance (webTAG at the time) the scope of the trans-Pennine Feasibility Study addressed the symptoms not the problem. The geographical scope of the study interpreted trans-Pennine as ‘connectivity between Manchester and Sheffield’, with the M62 excluded. National Park statutory purposes and policy were misunderstood and incorrectly applied. Objection from PDNPA confirms this.</p> <p><i>NH: Please see National Highways response to Second Written Question 4.2 in National Highways’ response to Second Written Questions (page 32, REP6-017).</i></p>	<p>We await NH’s response to the questions asked at ISH 3 before responding to this.</p>
<p>9.69.12 CPRE: The webTAG guidance towards generating and sifting options was not followed, and the assessment of the sifted options was not robust – 2015 sift of options is out of date and scheme has not been reassessed against strategic objectives</p> <p><i>NH: See previous responses regarding the Scheme assessment and consideration of alternatives postdating the DfT’s Decarbonisation Strategy and updated Green Book.</i></p>	<p>Despite inadequate testing, in the EAST assessment the HGV control system with complementary sustainable measures was equally effective as the current scheme at solving the problems along the route and only slightly less effective at meeting the objectives. Now, with all the results before us, the results of the EAST assessment on the A57 Link Roads remains highly questionable.</p>
<p>9.69.13 CPRE: Car Free Low Carbon Travel for Longdendale and Glossopdale measures. CPRE [in response to NH’s REP4-009 that these measures could be introduced outside of the scheme]: The increase in road capacity would increase car dependency and undermine GM’s policy aims for 50% of journeys by active travel and public transport by 2040, with a 17% reduction in car trips. DfT’s decarbonisation plan also seeks 50% of urban trips by active travel by 2030. Our proposed measures are</p>	<p>No evidence has been supplied of reductions in journey distance. ES Ch. 14, para 14.9.7 refers to increases, not decreases, in vehicle kilometres as the cause of increases in climate emissions.</p> <p>It is worth noting that total vehicle kilometres was one of the first pieces of information requested in March 2021 and has still not been supplied.</p>

<p>aligned with the GM policies. MTRU has shown the disbenefits and costs this would incur to GM for at least the next 30 years. The key point is that the encouragement of driving in urban areas directly undermines the policies for reducing by switching to walk, cycle and public transport, as set out in the DfT Decarbonisation Strategy and citywide policies such as in TfGM and Sheffield.</p> <p><i>NH: Both the Greater Manchester policies and the DfT Decarbonisation Strategy do not necessarily rule out increasing road capacity where necessary to enable economic development. The scheme enables significant reductions in journey distance, with trips to and from Manchester, which currently divert as far away as the M62 to cross the Pennines, being given a much more direct option. In addition, traffic through Mottram will be diverted onto the new link road away from populated areas.</i></p>	
<p>9.69.14 CPRE: Omission of Greater Manchester and Sheffield conurbations from the Study area The further work and ongoing data received reveals how far the scheme impacts lie in an area which is outside the Area of Detailed Modelling and therefore subject to major interventions to reduce the impact on traffic through masking and the fixed cost function (FCF). The zones and network were revised to give more detail in the immediate area of the scheme. Given its impacts are mainly in Manchester, even with the damping effects of masking and FCF, a similar approach should have been adopted in those areas.</p> <p><i>NH: National Highways, in consultation with the relevant stakeholders, did not identify a requirement to further refine the traffic model within Manchester. National Highways and the relevant highway authorities are satisfied that the level of detail in the traffic model is entirely appropriate for proportionate assessment of the impacts of the Scheme.</i></p>	<p>When scrutinised NH's response carries no weight. TfGM has not taken part in the Examination. Two local authorities and the PDNPA submitted holding objections in response to the 2020 consultation and the DCO application. The objections were based on lack of information about traffic and transport modelling which suggests much information was missing to them and, implicitly, TfGM regarding the traffic modelling.</p> <p>The Statement of Common Ground [SoCG REP2-019] between NH and TfGM substantiates this assertion. It indicates intermittent engagement between the two parties since July 2016, the majority of which was emails concerned with local junction layout and traffic control, and bus stop arrangements. With respect to traffic modelling, which is mentioned twice, the SoCG is clear that discussion only applies to the junctions – November 23 2020 'meeting with TfGM to discuss urban traffic control and traffic modelling specifically at Mottram Moor junction, Woolley Bridge junction and Gun Inn junction' (our emphasis) and on 30 November 2020 'to discuss urban traffic control and traffic modelling at the M47 J4 junction'. There is no reference to impacts on Greater Manchester west of the M67 J4 roundabout or of the wider traffic modelling.</p>

	<p>The failure of the traffic modelling to accurately reflect the scheme’s impact on Greater Manchester and evidence of the scheme’s failure to support the goals of the Greater Manchester Transport Strategy Right Mix policy have only emerged late in the Examination and only as a result of Keith Buchan’s work. The Examination is not aware of TfGM’s response to this late emerging evidence.</p>
<p>9.69.15 CPRE: Traffic model refinement - The TPU Stage 3 combined modelling and appraisal report indicates that model refinement took place to alter the distribution of traffic within Glossop, and through Tintwistle.</p> <p>NH REP4-009 responded: <i>The traffic modelling used to assess the Scheme is based on a refined and improved version of the Trans Pennine South Regional Model. The zoning covering Glossop within this model was previously treated at an aggregate level that was considered too coarse for adequate assessment of the Scheme. Consequently, the model was refined to ensure that the distribution of modelled trips better reflected the geographical spread of local housing and employment across Glossop by disaggregating the demand into more finely defined zones. The refinement of the traffic model therefore enabled a more accurate assessment to be undertaken of the likely forecast impact of the Scheme on traffic flows, including within Glossop and through Tintwistle.</i></p> <p>CPRE responded - The NH response essentially supports our comments made above in 9.69.14 (in bold) – it’s just that such refinement was not made in the western approaches to the scheme.</p> <p><i>NH: National Highways, in consultation with the relevant stakeholders, did not identify a requirement to further refine the traffic model within Manchester. National Highways and the relevant highway authorities are satisfied that the level of detail in the traffic model is entirely appropriate for proportionate assessment of the impacts of the Scheme.</i></p>	<p>When scrutinised NH’s response carries no weight. TfGM has not taken part in the Examination. Two local authorities and the PDNPA submitted holding objections in response to the 2020 consultation and the DCO application. The objections were based on lack of information about traffic and transport modelling which suggests much information was missing to them and, implicitly, TfGM regarding the traffic modelling.</p> <p>The Statement of Common Ground [SoCG REP2-019] between NH and TfGM substantiates this assertion. It indicates intermittent engagement between the two parties since July 2016, the majority of which was emails concerned with local junction layout and traffic control, and bus stop arrangements. With respect to traffic modelling, which is mentioned twice, the SoCG is clear that discussion only applies to the junctions – November 23 2020 ‘<i>meeting with TfGM to discuss urban traffic control and traffic modelling specifically at Mottram Moor junction, Woolley Bridge junction and Gun Inn junction</i>’ (our emphasis) and on 30 November 2020 ‘<i>to discuss urban traffic control and traffic modelling at the M47 J4 junction</i>’. There is no reference to impacts on Greater Manchester west of the M67 J4 roundabout or of the wider traffic modelling.</p> <p>The Statement of Common Ground [SoCG REP2-019] between NH and TfGM substantiates this assertion. It indicates intermittent engagement between the two parties since July 2016, the majority of which was emails concerned with local junction layout and traffic control, and bus stop arrangements. With respect to traffic modelling, which is mentioned twice, the SoCG is clear that discussion only applies to the junctions – November</p>

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<p>9.69.16 CPRE 4.2.7: In the context of the above model refinement the traffic forecasting results on the A628T east of Tintwistle and on Glossop High Street appear perverse.</p> <p><i>NH: The traffic modelling accurately forecasts changes in traffic flows due to the Scheme, including on the A628 east of Tintwistle and Glossop High Street.</i></p>	<p>This is a statement without evidence to substantiate it. We still have no explanation for the perverse traffic modelling results which we, Daniel Wimberley and others have made apparent. A number of the modelled flows are significantly lower than DfT counts. The latest perversity relates to the current traffic flows on the Snake Pass. DCC has a counter on the Pass and in its press release announcing reopening of the route post landslide, stated:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>'The 12 mile section of the A57, known as Snake Road is one of the highest roads in the Peak District and is used by more than 30,000 vehicles each week including 1,500 HGVs'.</i></p> <p>We understand these are average 7-day figures which gives 4,286 vehicles per day including 241 HGVs. These figures accord with DfT figures along the route. By contrast NH's modelled AADT figures for the Snake Pass in 2025 without the scheme are 3,050 with 1% HGVs. NH's modelled AADT flows are 29% lower than those recorded by DCC on its counter. This requires an explanation and challenges the traffic modelling results.</p>
<p>9.69.17 CPRE comment 4.2.10: It appears that refinement of the traffic model could have altered the outcomes for the environmental statement</p>	<p>This is a statement without evidence to substantiate it. We still have no explanation for the perverse traffic modelling results which we, Daniel Wimberley and others have made apparent. A number of the modelled</p>

<p>accompanying the DCO application. The assumption that modelled traffic would follow new routes may be unrealistic.</p> <p><i>NH: 2.1.16 The environmental statement is based on the traffic modelling undertaken to assess the impact of the Scheme, which as stated above, was refined to provide a higher degree of accuracy within the Area of Detailed Modelling (ADM). Regarding the assumption that modelled traffic would follow new routes may be unrealistic, see National Highways' response to 4.2.7 above.</i></p>	<p>flows are significantly lower than DfT counts. The latest perversity relates to the current traffic flows on the Snake Pass. In its press release 28 March 2022 announcing reopening of the route post landslip, DCC stated:</p> <p><i>'The 12 mile section of the A57, known as Snake Road is one of the highest roads in the Peak District and is used by more than 30,000 vehicles each week including 1,500 HGVs'.</i></p> <p>We understand that DCC has a counter on the Pass and these are average 7-day figures which gives 4,286 vehicles per day including 241 HGVs, which accord with DfT figures along the route. By contrast NH's modelled AADT figures for the Snake Pass in 2025 without the scheme are 3,050 with 1% HGVs. NH's modelled AADT flows are 29% lower than those recorded by DCC on its counter. This requires an explanation and challenges the traffic modelling results.</p>
<p>9.69.18 CPRE: No details of these schemes or developments are supplied or appended to the TAR. We asked to see the full details of the uncertainty log</p> <p><i>NH: The uncertainty log is included in Appendices B & C of the Traffic Forecasting Report that has previously been provided by National Highways to CPRE. The list of reasonably foreseeable developments that have been included in the traffic forecasts for the optimistic scenario sensitivity testis provided in Appendix A to this submission.</i></p>	<p>The uncertainty log has a whole section missing which was detailed in our previous submission (REP2-070, para 11 pp12-13) and reaffirmed in our ISH3 General Oral Submission by Keith Buchan, page 1. We think NH have not used the DfT Uncertainty toolkit and will ask for this to be recorded in the SoCG.</p>
<p>9.69.19 CPRE Comment: 4.2.18 Traffic Forecasts - The prediction of what would happen (the core scenario) without the scheme is based on forecasts from the DfT's National Trip End Model (NTEM). These take no account of the latest policies and programmes and thus overstate the rate of traffic growth.</p> <p><i>NH: The high and low growth scenarios have been prepared fully in accordance with the Department for Transport's (DfT) Transport Analysis Guidance (TAG).</i></p>	<p>NH have used Business As Usual forecasts which ignore the urban nature of the traffic predicted to use the scheme. There appear to have been new modelling runs, possibly using lower growth compatible with the Decarbonisation Plan. Details of these forecasts have not been supplied despite our requests. They would alter the value for money for this scheme as well as carbon and should be made transparent. Further details are in REP4-016 pp6-7 and in REP4-031 para 1 pp2-6.</p>
<p>9.69.20 CPRE Comment: 4.2.19 Journey times are misleading and inadequate CPRE did not and does not assume that the times are the</p>	<p>With respect to journey times our challenge was about the failure to present journey times between destinations in central Manchester and</p>

<p>basis for the economic appraisal. It is precisely because we did not think they represented the traffic impacts across the network that we asked for the information eventually supplied by NH's consultants. To highlight significant changes in specific journey times, as NH do in the TA, is misleading if these are not reflected in time savings as used for the appraisal. The new analysis of where the benefits actually occur confirms the CPRE view and justifies our data request.</p> <p><i>NH: The journey times presented in the Transport Assessment Report (TAR) (APP-185) are intended to give a high-level overview of the changes in journey times due to the Scheme on key strategic routes.</i></p>	<p>central Sheffield. In this answer, as in its answer to 9.69.4 above, NH appears to be retracting its claim of journey time improvements by stating these give a high level overview of the changes.</p> <p>The connectivity objective in the 2015 TransPennine Routes Feasibility Study included '<i>reduction in journey times and improved journey-time reliability</i>'. The reference to '<i>reduction in journey times</i>' was not included in the objectives for the 2018 and 2020 consultations or the DCO application. Instead the objectives are concerned only with journey time reliability, which is not the same as journey time reduction. The removal of '<i>reduction in journey times</i>' from the connectivity objective suggests that further work post-EAST analysis NH found that journey times would not decrease. Until the full journey times between Manchester and Sheffield centres are presented NH's claim of journey time improvements remains unsubstantiated.</p>
<p>Climate effects</p>	
<p>9.69.22 CPRE 3.6.2 The DfT have advised National Highways that a sensitivity test based on the impact of the policy measures set out in Transport Decarbonisation Plan (TDP) (July 2021) can now be undertaken for schemes. The results of this test along with the updated GH emissions based on EFTv11 has yet to be presented. It will be critical that we (and other IPs) understand what is being proposed and that all the equivalent information to that requested by us is made available in good time so that we can subject it to the appropriate level of scrutiny and produce a proper response. This would include the matrices for traffic, cost changes and public transport To be compatible with the DfT reduction to net zero, a full walking and cycling matrix would have to be included. This is because the reduction depends on a major increase in use of these modes through switching from car use and to a lesser extent to rail freight. If the carbon outputs and economics change substantially (which is highly likely) that would mean all the documents submitted at the beginning of the DCO process would be out of date. We would ask for an immediate</p>	<p>NH did not respond to this request. We have received no additional information regarding the analysis of the sensitivity test or the updated GHG emissions based on EFT v11 as requested through deadline 6 submission REP6-033 and at the ISH3.</p> <p>We repeat our request for information and support Dr Boswell's analysis of the situation regarding this new modelling and his proposal that the Examination should be suspended to allow the applicant to prepare an adequate ES.</p>

<p>dialogue with NH on this if they are proceeding with such re-modelling and sufficient time to take into account for what would have to be a revised submission.</p>	
<p>9.69.23 CPRE: The Applicant noted that the method used for the calculations within 4.4.23(a) (page 46) of the Written Representation is not clear, and therefore cannot comment. We supplied the calculation showing that a 63.4% (ie the UK's Nationally Determined Contribution) by 2030 of the current carbon emissions ~ 723,156tCO2 would require a reduction in emissions of 458,481tCO2. Instead with the scheme they increase to 756,232tCO2.</p> <p>NH: <i>When considering the impact of the Scheme on operational carbon emissions the Do-Minimum (DM [without Scheme]) data should be compared to the Do-Something (DS [with Scheme]) data for both the opening year (2025) and the design year (2040). Comparing DM and DS data for 2025: 737,485 and 742,808 tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) for operational carbon emissions respectively, gives a rise of 5325 tCO2e, the equivalent of a 0.7% increase in emissions with the Scheme Comparing DM and DS data for 2040: 785,179 and 792,072 tCO2e for operational emissions respectively, gives a rise of 6893 tCO2e, the equivalent of a 0.9% increase in emissions with the Scheme.</i></p>	<p>We undertook a calculation to show how, even without the scheme, carbon emissions require radical reduction. NH has ignored this evidence.</p>
<p>9.69.24 CPRE demonstrated the requirement for sectoral reductions in DfT Decarbonising Transport and the UK's Net Zero Strategy.</p> <p>NH REP4-009 replied that neither Parliament nor Government has identified any sectoral targets for carbon reductions related to transport, or any other sector. There is no requirement in the CCA 2008, or in Government policy, for carbon emissions for all road transport to become net zero. NH quotes <i>R(Transport Action Network) v Secretary of State for Transport [2021] EWHC 2095 (Admin)</i> ("the TAN case")</p> <p>NH: <i>These are general sectorial targets and are not specific to the roads sector. Our approach compares an inherently cumulative assessment to</i></p>	<p>NH's licence requires 5.29 ... <i>the Licence holder must comply with or have due regard to relevant Government policy, as advised by the Secretary of State, with full regard to any implications for the Licence holder's ability to deliver the Road Investment Strategy (emphasis in the document).</i></p> <p>5.30 <i>For the purposes of this section, "relevant Government policy" means all current policies which:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>a. Relate to the activities of the Licence holder, and</i> <i>b. Have been:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>i. Published in England by or on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, or</i> <i>ii. Indicated to the Licence holder by the Secretary of State.</i>

<p><i>national budgets, recognising, for example, that there are no legal duties for local authorities to achieve carbon budgets and there is no sectoral level target for transport, nor a baseline. Please refer to the Applicant's response to Issue Hearing 2 Item 6 c) and d) (REP5-026) for a fuller description of the methodology employed here.</i></p>	<p>Must is emphasised in the document as a statutory direction so NH must comply with it. The carbon emissions must be assessed against the sectorial targets in the UK Net Zero Strategy.</p>
<p>9.69.61 CPRE: Alerting the ExA to a delay in submitting our completed work on alternatives and carbon, which was contingent on getting the requested information from NH. A simplified version was agreed at NH's request so this is now a part of what was already less than requested. We consider impact on public transport and other sustainable modes, and how this has been modelled, as critical to assessment of this scheme. It will be even more important if the scheme is subject to new modelling using a forecast based on the DfT Decarbonisation Strategy, which now seems to be being proposed by NH (page 37, Item 6 of the Response to the ISH2). Despite pressing NH repeatedly on this public transport issue we have still not received the data we requested. This has inhibited our ability to make complete submissions within the timescales available, which otherwise we would. We do hope you would accept a late submission once we have the outstanding data and have analysed it.</p> <p><i>NH: As of 7 March 2022 the Applicant has provided all of the information requested from CPRE, with the exception of the External to External modelled Public Transport movements. This is because external to external modelled public transport demand is fixed, we can confirm the variable demand model does not modify these trip patterns and these values do not form any part of the appraisal for the A57 Scheme, this reasoning has also been conveyed to CPRE.</i></p>	
<p>9.69.54-56 CPRE specified the further information required on the new modelling using EFTv 11 and on the carbon sensitivity test using the carbon reduction trajectory in the DfT's Decarbonising Transport</p> <p><i>NH: refers us to REP5-069</i></p>	<p>REP5-069 does not supply the essential additional information required by the Examination in order to be able to understand the analysis that has been undertaken, see REP5-029 and Dr. Andrew Boswell's Deadline 8 submission</p>

NH response to REP4-050 Daniel Wimberley post hearing submission	
9.69.114 In its response to REP4-050 NH describe how the traffic model is calibrated against recorded traffic flows so that the modelled traffic flows match observed traffic flows within predefined acceptable margins of error. This is done to ensure that the baseline traffic model provides an accurate representation of the current traffic flows and the operation of the road network and can, thereby, be used as the foundation for developing the forecast year traffic models. NH claims that Webtris is a more accurate source of data than DfT traffic counts.	These arguments do not account for the spurious results of the traffic modelling. Webtris only supplies traffic flow data for the SRN, not for any of the local roads. On a number of local roads including several links on the A57 the modelled traffic flows do not reflect estimated or counted flows (see Table below). It is completely implausible for modelled traffic flows without the scheme in 2025 to be between 10% and 63% lower, or 30% to 271% higher, than the observed trend between 2015 and 2019 (see table below). The only information available to us is AADTs from DfT (NH only supplies AADT on 4 local roads in TAR Table 3.8, all of which are similar to the 2025 DM modelled flows). NH should supply the AADT for all these local roads between 2015 and 2019 in order for the Examination to be able to understand these discrepancies.

DFT AADT 2015 to 2019 baseline flows estimates except for those in blue cells which are counts; and NH 2025 'Do Minimum' Modelled Flows

Year	Woolley Lane	A57 Brookfield	A626 Glossop Rd	A6016 Primrose Ln	A57 High St West	A57 High St East	Norfolk Street	Victoria Street	A57 Snake Pass	A6018 Roe Cross Rd	A560 Stockport Rd
2015	18,202	16,902	4,321	6,712	17,253	7,424	2,447	9,237	4,195	16,765	6,139
2016	18,673	15,694	4,414	6,906	17,671	7,608	2,298	9,449	4,306	17,231	6,307
2017	18,723	15,739	4,444	6,932	17,678	7,616	2,212	9,443	3,984	14,838	6,325
2018	18,623	15,657	4,455	6,669	17,550	7,562	2,260	9,368	3,999	14,741	6,289
2019	18,768	15,781	4,468	6,724	17,704	7,045	2,079	8,195	4,008	14,868	6,216
Trend	stable	falling	stable	stable	stable	stable	stable	stable	stable	Falling	Stable
2025 DM	16,650	15,200	12,350	8,700	11,550	14,550	8,200	9,550	3,050	15,250	2,350

	Lower than observed from trend shown by DfT AADT 2015-2019
	Higher than observed from trend shown by DfT AADT 2015-2019
	Behaving with trend from 2015-2019 DfT counts

Green Belt

9.69.25 - NH claim the scheme is local transport infrastructure (LTI) for two reasons – (a) the Case for the Scheme justifies it as an LTI; (b) the scheme is an LTI according to NPPF 150c.

(a) The Case for the Scheme sets out the justification

There is no justification or reasoned argument for the scheme being LTI in the Case for the Scheme. Para 7.5.15 only states *'It is considered that the Scheme does not constitute inappropriate development as:*

- *It is a regional/local transport development, of approximately two miles, that cannot avoid a Green Belt location.*
- *The only way to avoid developing in the Green Belt would be to not progress the Scheme. The option assessment has demonstrated that there are no viable alternatives for the Scheme.'*

(b) Scheme is LTI under NPPF 150c

There is no definition in the NPPF of what constitutes 'local transport infrastructure' but NH uses three arguments to make its claim that it is; (i) Impact Assessment of NPPF 2012; (ii) scheme provides local benefits therefore it is LTI; (iii) legal case support.

(i) Impact Assessment of NPPF 2012

NH argues as follows. 'When introducing the reference to 'local transport infrastructure' into the NPPF 2012, the Secretary of State, in his Impact Assessment, recognised that as well as the park and ride schemes already (at the time) deemed to be appropriate, *"other local transport infrastructure schemes could be beneficial to communities in the Green Belt"*. An exhaustive list was not given but examples included (but were not limited to) infrastructure to support more public transport, such as opening new routes. The Impact Assessment noted that *"the policy change would enable local infrastructure schemes to be considered in the Green Belt without damaging the principles or protections of the Green Belt."*

NH has omitted the context for its arguments. Through the 2012 Impact Assessment the Secretary of State was considering policy changes to the NPPF 2012 (now replaced by the 2021 version), and made four changes *'in order to resolve technical issues relating to current policy'*. The Secretary of State's explanation for all four policy changes was that current policy had *'made it difficult for councils to consider development opportunities that could bring social, economic and environmental benefits to their communities, even if they cause no harm to the purpose of the Green Belt.'*

One of these four changes was ii. *'Park and Ride schemes are already permissible – it is proposed to extend this to a wider range of local transport infrastructure,'* the specific rationale for which was as follows.

In current policy, park and ride schemes in the Green Belt are 'not inappropriate

development' provided that certain criteria have been met. There are other local transport infrastructure schemes that could be beneficial to communities in the Green Belt. This includes, for example, infrastructure to support more public transport, such as opening new routes, providing bus shelters and small public transport interchanges. The policy change would enable local infrastructure schemes to be considered in the Green Belt without damaging the principles or protections of the Green Belt.

What is notable is that the Secretary of State made no policy change to accommodate a new NSIP or strategic dual carriageway. The change is focused on local transport measures that Councils could undertake, not on a scheme imposed by national Government on the locality.

(ii) Scheme provides local benefits therefore it is LTI

Based on the above passages from the NPPF 2012 Impact Assessment NH argues '*Whether the scheme delivers local public benefits can therefore be seen as an important aspect of whether it can be considered as local transport infrastructure*'. What is important here is **policy** in NPPF 2021, not an Impact Assessment of an outdated NPPF.

NH's claim that the scheme would support local benefits is a circular argument and is also not supported by the Impact Assessment, as we have shown above. As we show below the scheme objectives primarily relate to national objectives, and the local benefits are outweighed by the local disbenefits.

(iii) Legal case support

The interpretation of the meaning of 'local transport infrastructure' has been considered by various Examiners and the Secretary of State. NH refers to the M1 Junction 10a Grade Separation (Luton) 2013 decision and to the A19 / A184 Testo's Junction Alteration DCO to support its claim that the dual carriageway is local transport infrastructure. Neither of these judgements support NH's claim.

The M1 Junction 10a Grade Separation (Luton) 2013 decision as quoted by NH stated that: *"The scheme is an NSIP, but not all NSIPs necessarily have national significance in themselves. This scheme's objectives are all local and the improvements must be undertaken at and around the existing junction which lies in the Green Belt. Consequently I regard the scheme as a prime example of local transport infrastructure and accordingly it would not be inappropriate in the Green Belt"*.

Unlike the M1 Junction 10a Grade Separation (Luton), '*The Scheme has been developed to improve journeys between Manchester and Sheffield*' (REP2-016 Exec Summ p6, Purpose of the Scheme). The Case for the Scheme 3.1.1 makes this clear:

'The purpose of the Scheme (together with other proposed TPU works being advanced separately to this DCO) is to address longstanding issues of connectivity, congestion, reliability and safety of strategic Trans-Pennine routes between the M67 at Mottram in Longdendale and M1 Junction 36 and Junction 35A North of Sheffield'.

The Scheme's objectives are primarily strategic, as follows.

- The first objective is to improve connectivity between the Manchester and Sheffield city regions. It focuses on the SRN, on reducing congestion and improving the reliability of people's journeys through three villages – there is no objective to improve the traffic situation for the three villages, for Glossop or on other trans-Pennine routes which provide local connectivity.
- The second objective is also strategic as it seeks to avoid unacceptable impacts on the natural environment and landscape in the PDNP, a national designation with a national community. It also has a local element to improve air quality and noise in certain areas (not specified as local) through reduced congestion and removal of traffic from residential areas.
- The third objective again is strategic - to reconnect local communities along the Trans-Pennine route, again with no locality specified. According to NH's Southern Pennines Route Strategy 2017, both text and diagrams, the trans-Pennine route runs between the east and west coasts, supporting pan-regional travel across the north of England. The route offers important gateway access, including major ports in Liverpool, Bootle, Birkenhead and Humber, and Manchester Airport. It is part of the SRN for which NH claims pan-regional importance.
- The fourth objective concerns capacity - By reducing delays and queues that occur during busy periods and improving the performance of junctions on the route. Again NH has avoided specifying a locality as the first objective is seeking improved connectivity between the Greater Manchester and South Yorkshire City Regions. Included within the scheme's traffic modelling are other changes along the route for which NH does not require development consent but that are key improvements for those making journeys on the trans-Pennine route - Safety and technology improvements and improvements to the A616/A61 Westwood roundabout. These specifically address the congestion on the eastern sections of the route as shown in the 2017 South Pennines Route Strategy.

The majority of the objectives for the scheme are strategic, as they are intended to mesh with future improvements planned for whole of the trans-Pennine route. This has been the theme since the 2015 Transpennine Routes Feasibility and the imbalance between strategic and local is well shown in the Equality Impact Assessment para 1.3 [APP-057] where the limited local benefits are outlined. They are exaggerated - traffic is removed from only one main road in Mottram in Longdendale, on the north-south route through the village traffic increases; better conditions for pedestrians and cyclists are not created throughout Mottram in Longdendale, as traffic increases on the north south route; reduction of congestion and delays in the area would not apply to Glossopdale where congestion and delays would increase. In conclusion, the scheme's objectives are primarily strategic, not local, and local benefits are limited. Therefore this legal case does not support NH's arguments.

The ExA for the A19 / A184 Testo's Junction Alteration DCO considered that *"the Development Plan proposal support provided for the Proposed Development through a site allocation establishes that it is 'local transport infrastructure which can demonstrate a requirement for a Green Belt location'", and the Secretary of State agreed with this reasoning, finding that that scheme was "not an inappropriate development on Green Belt*

land for which a very special circumstances case would need to be considered". The case rests on the definition of local transport infrastructure which as we have shown above does not apply to the dual carriageway. The scheme has been promoted as an NSIP by NH and it fulfils the Planning Act 2008 requirements for a highway to be an NSIP². The dual carriageway therefore remains inappropriate development, according to NPPF 150c.

NH then concludes that the Scheme can be considered a local transport scheme under NPPF paragraph 150 (c). As we have shown above none of NH's arguments can be substantiated when scrutinised.

9.69.26 Scheme conflicts with the purposes of the Green Belt

NH focused on refuting our comment that the scheme will create a new logical boundary to the urban areas. In REP5-028 page 19 we quoted the response by IP Savills on behalf of Crossways Commercial Estate REP2-084 for a new sustainable urban extension (SUE) of 600-700 houses between the single carriageway and Hollingworth/Mottram Moor, as a good example of potential infill.

A good example of the impact of new National Highways' SRN infrastructure on the Green Belt is that of the M65³. Before the motorway was built, Blackburn with Darwen was encircled by Green Belt to contain development and prevent sprawl into the surrounding countryside. The potential erosion of Green Belt was raised by objectors at the inquiry but the Department of Transport responded, *'there was no reason to expect significant development along the axis of the motorway.'* However, the construction of the motorway caused modification to the Green Belt boundary, which was cut back to the line of the motorway north of Junction 5 at Guide; the section between the motorway and Blackburn is now business and industrial development and housing.

9.69.27 The scheme must be assessed against Green Belt policy not against land take

NH claims that the scheme is compliant with Green Belt policy, quoting the response of two local authorities to ExA questions regarding Green Belt. We await the answer to the questions posed in ISH3.

9.69.28 Adverse impact on Mottram Conservation Area

NH concludes that *'On balance therefore, it is considered that while the Scheme would result in adverse effects on the conservation area in relation to its setting around Mottram Moor and views from Edge Lane, there would also be a beneficial effect on the appearance and character of the conservation area during operation brought about by the substantial reduction in traffic on the A57 and associated reductions in noise and visual intrusion within the conservation area.'*

We are pleased that NH agrees with our assessment about the adverse impacts of the scheme on the setting of Mottram Moor and views from Edge Lane. However we do not agree with the balance struck. First, the adverse impacts are greater than NH describes - the

² Planning Act s.14(1), s.22; ES Ch.1-4 1.3.3; application form

³ End of the Road? The impact of road projects in England, Transport for Quality of Life for CPRE 2017 page 87.

western half of the dual carriageway streaming with traffic would be unscreened in views from Harrop Edge and Edge Lane. Second, the benefits are less than NH describes as the adverse impacts on Mottram's distinctive character have been ignored. Although traffic reduces on the western end of the A57 Mottram Moor and on Hyde Road within the Conservation Area, it increases in other parts of the Conservation Area - on Market Street and Stalybridge Road which both experience greater adverse impacts than without the Scheme. The increase on Market Street with its village cross is particularly adverse. Hence the overall balance is negative, as we showed in REP2-069.

9.69.29 Scheme harms openness of the Green Belt

NH claims that the Environmental Masterplan Overview REP6-020 demonstrates the landscape fit balances openness and alignment with landscape character. It does not. The Masterplan is a single aerial photograph with the scheme superimposed on the ground. This view may show the spatial layout of the scheme in two dimensions within the locality but it does not address all the other fundamentals that have to be taken into account with respect to openness. According to Government planning guidance these include but are not limited to:

- *'both spatial and visual aspects – in other words, the visual impact of the proposal may be relevant, as could its volume;*
- *the duration of the development, and its remediability – taking into account any*
- *provisions to return land to its original state or to an equivalent (or improved) state of openness; and*
- *the degree of activity likely to be generated, such as traffic generation.'*

The 3-D character of the scheme, the visual aspects of the scheme, the permanency of the scheme and the substantial traffic volumes it would carry have not been addressed by the Environmental Masterplan Overview. Therefore no new evidence has been provided to refute harm the scheme imposes on the openness of the Green Belt.

9.69.30 No 'very special circumstances' exist to outweigh the harm

We will respond to NH's and the local authorities' answers to the questions posed in ISH3 at the appropriate deadline.